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Abstract. – The stable marriage problem has been introduced in order to describe a complex
system where individuals attempt to optimise their own satisfaction, subject to mutually con-
flicting constraints. Due to the potential large applicability of such model to describe all the
situation where different objects has to be matched pairwise, the statistical properties of this
model have been extensively studied. In this paper we present a generalization of this model,
introduced in order to take into account the presence of correlations in the lists and the effects
of distance when the player are supposed to be represented by a position in space.
The problem of matching different players represents a well known problem in the area of
operational research. A simple and sensible model one can build to face this situation is the
stable marriage one. In its traditional formulation [1–3] one deals with two sets of N players
each of whom has an own list of the players of the other set that he/she likes. The first one in
the list is the one he/she likes more, the last one is the less liked. It has already been fruitful
to apply the ideas of the statistical physics in order to derive some properties of this model.
In particular one would be tempted to study how “to optimise” the set of matchings in the
system such that to maximise the general satisfaction. Under this respect the stable marriage
problem can be considered as a prototype model for the social science and the economy where
decision-makers are individuals or companies. They have their own selfish goals to optimise,
which are often conflicting. The stable marriage optimization problem does not require the
total satisfaction to be the largest possible, but that the resulting state be stable against the
egoistic attempts of individuals to improve their situation. This new concept of equilibrium
is familiar in game theory where anyone tries to maximise his utility at the same time. This
is the concept of Nash equilibrium [4], where a state is characterised by the stability with
respect to the action of any agent. In other words, a state is stable if any change in an agent’s
strategy is unfavorable for himself. In this paper we use some of the results on the statistical
properties of the stable marriage problem as obtained by Ref. [5] [6]. We then generalise
the model by introducing amongst the different players lists a correlation that should reduce
the arbitrarity in the list compilation. In other words our model refers to a more real world
where the beauty or the uglyness does exist and affects in similar way the players lists. In this
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direction goes also the second generalization that we introduce and study in this paper. We
put the players on a lattice and we consider explicitly the effect of distance in their matching.
The marriage problem describes a system where two sets of N persons have to be matched
pairwise. In this formulation of the model all the players have to marry. By suitably changing
the language of the model, the same situation can be applied to different contexts where two
distinct sets have to be matched with the best satisfaction. Just to fix ideas we will use
here the more intuitive language of the man-woman matching, to explain the definition of
the model. Based on his judgment, each man establishes a wish-list of his desired women, in
such a way that the top of the list is the woman he likes more. Women do the same for the
men. Following Ref. [5] we assume also that each person’s satisfaction depends on the rank
of the partner he/she gets to marry. This allows us to regards the rank as a cost function
to mimimise. If the top choice is attained, the cost is the least, the bottom choice has the
highest cost. We will consider in the following the case where the lists are random but not
independently established.
In order to set up the notation let us look at the following example of three men and three
women. The preference lists for all persons are shown below. We will use the symbol mi for
the i-th man (i = 1, .., N) and wi to index women, in such a way that a list L(mi) of man mi
can be described as:
L(m1) = {w1, w2, w3}
L(m2) = {w1, w3, w2}
L(m3) = {w2, w3, w1}
L(w1) = {m3,m1,m2}
L(w2) = {m1,m2,m3}
L(w3) = {m3,m2,m1} (1)
If man m2 marries woman w3 (the second of his list) we assign to the marriage a cost 2
equal to the rank of his wife. The minimum the cost the greater the satisfaction of the man.
It is convenient to introduce a representation of the lists in terms of rankings: We define the
matrices F and H for women and men respectively, such that the element f(wi,mj) denotes
the position of a man mj in the list of the woman wi. Equivalently h(mj , wi) yields the rank
of the woman wi in the man mj ’s list. A realization of the preference lists is also called an
instance and we indicate that as the set {m,w}i of the couples i where i = 1, ..., N . We call
a stable matching M = {m,w}i (where i = 1, ..N) a state where one cannot find a man m
and a woman w who are not married but would both prefer to marry each other rather than
staying with their respective partners. Such a couple is called a blocking pair. If no such pair
exists, the matching is called stable. One can calculate the energy per person, for women and
men in a given matching as
ǫF (M) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
f(w,m)i
ǫH(M) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(m,w)i (2)
where f(w,m)i gives the rank of man m for the woman w in the i-th couple, and where
h(m,w)i gives the rank of woman w for the man m in the i-th couple. The energy ǫ(M) =
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ǫF (M) + ǫH(M) is the energy per couple. Here and in the following the subscripts F and H
stand for women and men, respectively.
To compute one stable state of the system it is usually used the classical Gale-Shapley
(GS) algorithm [1] which assigns the role of proposers to the elements of one set, the men say,
and of judgers to the elements of the other. The man-oriented GS algorithm starts from a
man m making a proposal to the first woman w on his list. If she accepts they get engaged,
if she refuses m goes on proposing to the next woman on his list. w accepts a proposal when
either she is not engaged or she is engaged with a man m′ worse than the one proposing (m).
In the latter case, m′ will proceed to the woman following w on his list. When all men have
run through their lists proposing until all women are engaged, the algorithm stops and the
engagements result in marrings and matching thus reached is a stable matching.
As regards the previous example of a system with N = 3 players, the man-oriented GS
algorithm goes as follows: man m1 proposes to woman w1 who accepts and they form the
pair (m1, w1). Then m2 proposes to w1, but she refuses. So man m2 proposes to woman
w3 and they get married. Finally man m3 happily marries woman w2. This results in the
matching MH = {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)}. If the GS algorithm is run by reversing the
roles (woman-oriented) to yield the woman-optimal stable matching. In our example, this
leads to MF = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}.
The energies for men and women in these matchings are (ǫH , ǫF ) = (4/3, 7/3) and (6/3, 5/3)
respectively for MH and MF . As extensively studied in the ref. [5] who proposes is always
better off than who judges. The man-oriented GS algorithm yields the man-optimal stable
matching in the sense that no man can have a better partner in any other stable matching.
All the above results hold in the case that the rank any player assigns to the other sex
players are randomly extracted from a uniform distribution. A more realistic situation would
apply if the players are characterised by what is commonly indicated by “beauty” that is some
of the players have a finite probability to be high in rank in all the opposite sex players lists.
We tried to model the intrinsic beauty of players in such a way to generalize the ordinary
stable marriage problem that can be derived now as a particular case. For that reason in the
new formulation we still have a random contribution in the score a players receives from the
opposite sex players. Nevertheless a second contribution in the score formation is given by a
parameter weighting the intrinsic properties of the player. In particular we assigned to each
man/woman a parameter Im or Iw respectively. The score S a woman receives in the opinion
of a man is given by
S = ηmw + UIw (3)
Where ηm is a random number belonging to the interval (0, 1) reflecting the personal opinion
of manm on woman w. The second term Iw is again drawn from the interval (0, 1) and reflects
the intrinsic properties of woman w; it stays the same in all the scores for woman w given by
every man in the set. U is a parameter to weight the second contribution. At this point all
the women have a score for the man m that can now form the list in descending order, that
is the lower the score the higher the rank. In this way a small Iw represents a nice woman for
U >> 1 (where the first contribution plays no role) conversely a value of U = 0 corresponds
to the standard stable marriage problem. At this point we run the GS algorithm in order
to detect the stable states. As regards the statistical properties of the energy for such states
we start by considering the original case where the values of f(w,m)i and h(m,w)i differs
each other. This is the first plot present from above in Fig.1. For this case no difference
exists for the different players in the set and the average value of this rank over 1000 different
realisation stays more or less the same. This is not the case however when one rank the players
in function of their beauty such that the first ones are the more good-looking. At this point
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the situation dramatically change and the satisfaction now is dependent upon the intrinsic
quality of the players. This is evident in the second plot where U is equal to 0.1 and even
clearer in the last one where U is equal to 1. It is interesting to note, however, that even if
the more beautiful players have by far a larger satisfaction in their matching with respect to
the others, the general unsatisfaction in the system increases. As a matter of fact, when the
concept of “most beautiful” in the world tends to be the same for everyone it becomes more
and more difficult to make more people happy. However, the presence of beauty transforms
in a fairer way the GS algorithm that now tends to give the same results regardless the sex.
In all the plots of Fig.1 we called “male” those who propose and “female” those who judge.
This means that “male” refers to both men in the man-oriented GS algorithm and to women
in the woman-oriented GS algorithm. Another way to describe how correlations in lists affect
the statistical properties of the stable state, is to consider what is the probability P (R) that
a player will have a partner of rank R in his/her list. If in the case of uncorrelated lists it is
easier to make more people happy, this would reflect in a distribution of partner’s rank peaked
around the lowest values of rank. Conversely when beauty takes place one has to expect a
more spread distribution until the limit case where only beauty takes place where one has
to expect a uniform probability. Indeed if U → ∞ all the players have the same list. They
can be accomplished according to their own rank and since they are drawn from a uniform
probability this results in this limit in a step function for the quantity P (R). Between these
two limits, one can observe a transient behaviour where P (R) is a power law in R as shown
in Fig.2.
Another generalisation that we introduce in order to deal with a realistic situation can be
obtained by considering a spatial distribution of players and by adding an additional cost for
all the marriages that happen at a large distance. In complete analogy to what has been done
for the beauty we will define the score of woman w for man m as
S = ηmw + αd(m,w) (4)
where d(m,w) is the euclidean normalised distance between two players arranged on a d −
dimensional lattice and α weights this contribution in the score formation. Since the first
part of the score takes into account the personal opinions through a random number drawn
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 we normalise the value of distance by dividing it
for the larger value of the distance possible in the system (i.e. in d = 1 for N players we have
a maximum of N/2). In this way a value of α = 0 corresponds to the classical case, whilst in
the limit of α = 0 the dynamics is dominated by nearest neighbors marriages. In this case we
did not found any difference from the classical case for what regards the GS algorithm. Also
in this case the man-oriented algorithm and the woman-oriented brings to different stable
states more convenient for men and women respectively. The reason for that in our opinion is
in the fact that different random lists form different metastable states that GS can explore in
the finding of stability. This scenario is destroyed by the presence of correlations that tends
to form a common judgement for all the players (at least for those more beautiful that can
choose). When distance is taken into account, instead, this new effect does not produce a
player that is most beautifulk than the other and that moves for everyone on the top of the
lists. What happens iin this cases that for every player one has a subset of the neighbours
(and they are different for every player!) that get some advantage in the matching. To show
this effect we plotted in Fig.3 how the probability function P ′(d) to get married with a partner
at a distance d varies with α.
We have generalised the classical stable marriage problem to the more realistic situation
when correlations are present in the lists and when the effect of spatial distance between players
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are taken into account. The classical stable marriage problem can be considered a prototype
model for the game theory where the concept of Nash equilibrium plays the central role. The
game-theoretical definition of stability result in the formation of stable states that are not the
globally best solution. We show that the presence of correlation removes the difference in the
stable state that is produced when the utility of one kind of player is maximised with respect
to the opposite sex players. The presence of correlation in the wish lists reduces the general
satisfaction in the system but distributes it in a fairer way. A similar result is found when
spatial distance between players is taken into account.
In conclusion our paper shows that in case of more realistic situations the framework of
Nash equilibria for the game theory do not necessarily apply. This result in a more conventional
search for stable state in the problems of matching.
This work was supported by the European Network contract FMRXCT980183.
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Fig. 1 – Energy of men (ǫH) and women (ǫF ) for all the players (N = 512) averaged over 1000 of
stable matchings. above in the first plot we present the results corresponding to the usual case of
uncorrelated lists. Proceeding below we present the same quantities as the parameter U increases.
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Fig. 2 – Density function P (R) giving the probability that a male m is married with a woman w
that is ranked R in his list.
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Fig. 3 – Density function P’(d) giving the probability to have a marriage where male and female are
divided by a normalised distance d.
